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Digital streaming has emerged as a primary format for 
communication of creative works in the last two decades. The user-
uploaded content site is now one of the most prominent platforms for 
streaming creative works. Because of safe harbor laws that limit liability 
for infringement of copyrighted works, these user-uploaded content sites 
have little incentive to fairly pay content creators for the use of works 
uploaded by the sites’ users. This perceived value gap created by unfair 
payment has led copyright owners to call for copyright reform that would 
provide an opportunity for fairer compensation and create more liability 
for the user-uploaded content platforms. This note will address the value 
gap and unfair remuneration caused by safe harbor laws that allow user-
uploaded content sites to avoid liability for infringement of copyright 
owner’s works. This note will also address the need for copyright reform 
in light of the European Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy 
and analyzes the European Union’s most recent attempts at reformation. 
Finally, this note will suggest a possible solution for reform modeled 
after YouTube’s Content ID system that would close the value gap and 
provide fair remuneration for content creators while not conflicting with 
the fundamental right to freedom of expression. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the musical, literary, and video repertoires of the world available 
at a moment’s notice in the modern digital streaming era of the Internet, 
it is difficult not to ponder whether content creators feel blessed to live in 
a time when their music, books, and movies can be distributed to the 
billions of people of the world with relative ease. These ponderings 
quickly dissolve after coming across an article with the captivating title: 
Why Musicians Are So Angry at the World’s Most Popular Music 
Streaming Service.1 
YouTube, accounting for twenty-five percent of all worldwide music 
streaming, has been accused by copyright owners of taking advantage of 
“safe harbor” provisions in copyright laws, which allow them to avoid 
liability for copyright-infringing works uploaded by their users.2 These 
safe harbor provisions have led to a “value gap,” which has resulted in 
copyright owners not being fairly compensated for the streaming of their 
works on the site.3 A prominent group of content creators implored the 
European Commission4 to reform copyright laws to address the value 
gap and unfair remuneration.5 The European Commission acknowledged 
the need for copyright reform that would address the value gap and 
remuneration in its communications regarding the Digital Single Market 
  
 1. Todd C. Frankel, Why Musicians Are So Angry at the World’s Most Popular 
Music Streaming Service, WASH. POST (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-musicians-are-so-angry-at-the-
worlds-most-popular-music-streaming-service/2017/07/14/bf1a6db0-67ee-11e7-8eb5-
cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html. 
 2. Id. For an explanation of the safe harbor provisions in copyright laws, see 
discussion infra Section III.A.
 3. See Frankel, supra note 1. 
 4. The European Commission is the branch of the European Union government 
that plans, prepares, and proposes new European Union laws. What the European 
Commission Does in Law, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-
commission/what-european-commission-does/law_en (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). “The 
Commission submits a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and the Council of 
the European Union, who must agree on the text for it to become EU law.” Id. 
 5. INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS. (IFPI), GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT 
2017, 24, 26 (2017). 
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Strategy for Europe.6 After many communications, the European 
Commission proposed a new directive to reform copyright in the Digital 
Single Market.7 This proposal for copyright reform incited debate over 
user-uploaded content (UUC) sites’ ability to avoid liability for 
infringing works appearing on their sites under safe harbor laws.8 
II. BACKGROUND  
Over the last fifteen years, digital streaming, most notably the 
streaming of video and audio works on Internet platforms such as Netflix 
and Spotify, has transformed the market for communication of creative 
works.9 The music industry has acknowledged that the significant 
increase in digital streaming has been a primary factor for the growth of 
the industry over the last decade.10 In fact, digital streaming is now the 
dominant distribution format for the music industry.11 While there is a 
variety of digital streaming services, UUC sites have become an 
increasingly common platform for digital streaming.12  
  
 6. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges 
for Europe, at 8, COM (2016) 288 final (May 25, 2016); see generally Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Single Market 
Strategy for Europe, COM (2015) 192 final (June 5, 2015) [hereinafter DSMS 
Communication]. 
 7. William New, Concern Grows over Spread of EU Copyright Filtering Rules, 
INFOJUSTICE (June 18, 2019), http://infojustice.org/archives/41212; see generally 
Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L130) 92 [hereinafter 2019 Copyright Directive]. 
 8. IFPI, supra note 5, at 26. 
 9. See DELOITTE, DIGITAL MEDIA: RISE OF ON-DEMAND CONTENT 5-6 (2015), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/technology-media-
telecommunications/in-tmt-rise-of-on-demand-content.pdf. 
 10. IFPI, supra note 5, at 7.  
 11. Id. at 16. 
 12. See Joseph Dimont, Note, Royalty Inequity: Why Music Streaming Services 
Should Switch to a Per-Subscriber Model, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 676–77 (2018). 
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UUC sites allow users to upload material that other users will then 
download or stream.13 These sites emerged in 2004 concurrently with the 
development of Web 2.0.14 Websites within Web 2.0 have the capability 
of being a platform for users to upload copyrighted content, in contrast to 
Web 1.0, where the websites themselves primarily provided content.15 
One of the largest UUC sites, YouTube, is said to be “the largest music 
streaming site in the world,” having over a billion users.16 While artists 
are optimistic concerning the role of streaming in the growth of their 
industry,17 they have been critical of UUC sites that hide behind online 
liability laws and exploit the artists’ content.18 
The UUC sites are allegedly taking advantage of these liability laws, 
known as “safe harbor” laws, discussed in more detail later, and 
exploiting copyright owners’ content by allowing streaming of 
copyrighted works for a profit without providing fair remuneration to 
those investing in and creating those works.19 This exploitation has led to 
what is now known as the “value gap.”20 The value gap is defined as “the 
mismatch between the value that user upload services extract from music 
  
 13. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, INT’L CONFEDERATION OF SOC’YS OF AUTHORS & 
COMPOSERS (CISAC), ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS 2 (2018), 
https://www.cisac.org/Media/Studies-and-Reports/Publications/Transfer-of-Value-
Study/Dr.-Stan-Liebowitz-Economic-Analysis-of-Safe-Harbor-Provisions. 
 14. Martin B. Robins, A Good Idea at the Time: Recent Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act § 512(c) Safe Harbor Jurisprudence – Analysis and Critique of Current 
Applications and Implications, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 4 (2012) (explaining 
that when “technology evolved to allow easy submission and posting to Web sites of 
user-generated content from computers” and other devices, Web 2.0 applications, in 
particular user-generated content sits, were developed as “users gain[ed] the ability to 
upload, edit, and collaborate in information dissemination,” in contrast with Web 1.0). 
 15. See Leron Solomon, Note, Fair Users or Content Abusers? The Automatic 
Flagging of Non-Infringing Videos by Content ID on YouTube, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 237, 
238 n.10, 250–51 (2015). 
 16. LIEBOWITZ, supra note 13, at 2. 
 17. See IFPI, supra note 5, at 7. 
 18. Id. at 26. 
 19. Id. at 25–26. 
 20. Id. at 25. But see Giancarlo F. Frosio, Reforming Intermediary Liability in the 
Platform Economy: A European Digital Single Market Strategy, 112 NW. U.L. REV. 
ONLINE 18, 28 (2017) (stating that the “value gap” is fabricated and that “in reality, the 
digital platform economy has created value for content providers, not a value gap that 
needs to be closed”). 
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and the revenue returned to creators and investors.”21 An example of the 
value gap can be seen by looking at the relative percentages paid to 
copyright owners by YouTube, a UUC site, and Spotify, a permission-
based subscription streaming service.22 Spotify pays seventy percent of 
its revenues to copyright owners, while YouTube pays only fifty-five 
percent.23 
The revenue-earned to revenue-paid percentage disparity is not the 
only reason that copyright owners feel they are compensated unfairly for 
the streaming of their works on UUC sites: the actual dollar amounts per 
stream paid to copyright owners by many UUC sites are significantly 
lower than that of other streaming services.24 For example, Spotify pays 
copyright owners approximately $7.50 for every one thousand streams,25 
whereas YouTube pays only approximately $1.50 for the same number 
of streams.26 The lower amount paid by YouTube is a result of the 
combination of two factors: (1) the amount of revenue earned per stream, 
and (2) the percentage of that revenue paid to the copyright owners.27 
YouTube may generate less revenue than subscription-based services 
partly because they currently do not maximize profits from 
advertisement revenue, as they allow “skippable” ads.28 These skippable 
ads do not require advertisers to pay if a user chooses to skip the 
advertisement, resulting in less advertising revenue earned by YouTube. 
  
 21. Poppy Reid, The EU’s New Copyright Law Could Change the Entire Music 
Industry, INDUSTRY OBSERVER, (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://theindustryobserver.thebrag.com/the-eu-parliaments-digital-copyright-directive/. 
The value gap is not limited to music, however, as many different content creators have 
spoken out against the value gap, including photographers, composers, lyricists, 
cartoonists, and film directors. Helen Smith et al., Value Gap is Crucial for the Music 
Sector, GUARDIAN (July 24, 2016, 2:43 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/24/valu-gap-music-sector-youtube. 
 22. See LIEBOWITZ, supra note 13, at 20. 
 23. Id. at 30. 
 24. See id. at 29. 
 25. Id. at 29. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 30. 
 28. See id. at 28. 
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29 This, in turn, leads to even less monetizing revenue for the copyright 
owners.30 
UUC sites are able to stream copyrighted works for profit because of 
the safe harbor online liability laws currently in place that limit their 
liability for infringement.31 In the European Union (EU), these online 
liability laws are found in the E-Commerce Directive—a directive 
primarily focused on legal aspects of electronic commerce—which was 
enacted in 2000, 32 prior to the debut of Web 2.0 applications in 2004.33 
Similar laws limiting online liability in the United States are found in the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), also predating the 
emergence of Web 2.0 and the prevalence of UUC sites.34 At the time 
these laws that limit liability were enacted, legislators had not foreseen 
the possibility of UUC sites that would enable users to upload 
extraordinarily large amounts of copyrighted works and allow other users 
to stream those works.35 The EU last notably updated its copyright laws 
in 2001 when it enacted the Information Society Copyright Directive 
(2001 Copyright Directive).36 The 2001 Copyright Directive, the last 
significant update of EU copyright law, predates the development of 
Web 2.0 and UUC sites.37 Because these laws limiting liability have 
  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 30. Additionally, another comparison shows that an ad-supported 
Spotify (as opposed to the subscription-based platform) pays $2.11 per thousand streams 
as compared to that comparison’s determination of ad-supported YouTube’s $1.20 per 
thousand streams. Id. at 31. 
 31. Id. at 2. These liability-limiting laws, resulting in the safe harbor regime, are 
discussed in infra Section III.A. 
 32. Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular 
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), art. 
14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive]. 
 33. Robins, supra note 14, at 4. 
 34. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202(a), 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
 35. LIEBOWITZ, supra note 13, at 7. 
 36. See generally Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter 2001 
Copyright Directive]. 
 37. They have, however, enacted other Directives concerning various aspects of 
copyright, but none of them have been truly significant regarding updating liability in 
light of Web 2.0. See generally Directive 2006/115/EC, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain 
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allowed a staggering number of infringing uploads of copyrighted 
content on UUC sites and led to the existence of the value gap,38 the 
EU’s copyright laws are overdue for much-needed reform. The European 
Commission proposed such a copyright reform in furtherance of its 
Digital Single Market Strategy.39 
A. The Digital Single Market Strategy 
The Digital Single Market Strategy (DSMS) attempts to connect the 
twenty-eight separate national markets of the EU into a single market.40 
The Communication from the Commission regarding the DSMS (DSMS 
Communication) for Europe states that the “Digital Single Market is one 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured and where individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and 
exercise online activities under conditions of fair competition, . . . 
irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.”41 The Commission 
lists three notable “pillars” on which the strategy is built, which are 
“[b]etter access for consumers and businesses to online goods and 
services across Europe,” “[c]reating the right conditions for digital 
networks and services to flourish,” and “[m]aximising the growth 
potential of [the] European Digital Economy.”42 The Commission states 
that the DSMS will provide better online access and new opportunities 
for businesses and entrepreneurs across Europe and that “action is . . . 
required to break down barriers to cross-border online activity including 
  
Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 28 
(“Rental Directive”); Directive 2009/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 2009 O.J. (L 
111) 16 (“Computer Programs Directive”); Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan 
Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5 (“Orphan Works Directive”); Directive 2014/26/EU, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on Collective Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical 
Works for Online Use in the Internal Market, 2014 O.J. (L 84) 72 (“Collective 
Management Directive”). 
 38. LIEBOWITZ, supra note 13, at 35. 
 39. See Giancarlo Frosio, To Filter, or Not to Filter? That Is the Question in EU 
Copyright Reform, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 331, 335–36 (2018). 
 40. Id. at 334. 
 41. DSMS Communication, supra note 6, at 3. 
 42. Id. at 3–4. 
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differences in . . . copyright law between Member States.”43 The 
Commission further addresses the need to consider measures that would 
safeguard fair remuneration of content creators “in order to encourage 
the future generation of content.”44 
The first step in bringing copyright law into conformity with the goals 
of the DSMS would be to propose a new EU copyright directive. The 
process of EU law reform begins when the European Commission 
proposes new EU legislation either by its own initiative or by invitation 
from the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the 
European Parliament, or by citizens, via a European Citizens’ Initiative.45 
EU treaties set out objectives and rules for EU institutions, and 
secondary laws, including regulations and directives, come from the 
objectives and principles set forth in those treaties.46 Directives and 
regulations are different in one major respect. A directive sets forth a 
particular result and requires EU member countries to implement 
measures that will incorporate (transpose) those results into each 
respective country’s national laws to satisfy the objectives of that 
directive.47 Each EU member country is free to determine on their own 
the best way to incorporate a directive’s particular desired result into its 
national laws.48 A regulation, on the other hand, applies uniformly and 
automatically to all EU member countries without the need for 
transposition into national laws.49 
B. Directive Proposals, Their Reception, and an Opportunity for 
Effective Copyright Reform in the Modern Internet Era 
The European Commission, in furtherance with the DSMS, drafted 
the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
  
 43. Id. at 4. 
 44. Id. at 7. 
 45. Planning and Proposing Law, EUR. COMMISSION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law_en (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2019). 
 46. Types of EU Law, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-
making-process/types-eu-law_en (last visited Nov. 8, 2019). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (2016 Proposal),50 
which included provisions that attempt to give copyright owners 
increased protection against possible infringement.51 The European 
Parliament approved this proposal on September 12, 2018, and the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union then had 
several meetings for compromise negotiations regarding revisions of 
specific articles of the proposed directive.52 As a result of these 
negotiations, a revision of the Proposal was introduced on February 13, 
2019,53 and the new Directive (2019 Copyright Directive) was approved 
by the European Parliament in April 2019.54 
The new Directive attempts to provide measures to aid in the fair 
compensation of content creators for content shared through UUC sites.55 
The 2016 Proposal first approved by the European Parliament contained 
a provision that would have held online platforms liable in the event of 
copyright infringements occurring on UUC sites.56 To avoid liability, 
those online platforms would have been required to implement filters to 
block copyrighted content in an effort to prevent the availability of 
copyright-infringing works uploaded by users.57 The final version of the 
Directive has removed any explicit mention of filtering technologies, but 
  
 50. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016) 
[hereinafter 2016 Proposal]. 
 51. Ryan Brown, European Union Copyright Laws Change, GUILFORDIAN (Sept. 
21, 2018) https://www.guilfordian.com/worldnation/2018/09/21/european-union-
copyright-laws-change/. 
 52. Julia Reda, EU Copyright Reform/Expansion, JULIA REDA (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://juliareda.eu/eu-copyright-reform/#timetable (click “Show past events” hyperlink 
under “Timetable”). 
 53. Julia Reda, The Text of Article 13 and the EU Copyright Directive Has Just 
Been Finalised, JULIA REDA (Feb. 13, 2019), https://juliareda.eu/2019/02/eu-copyright-
final-text/. 
 54. New, supra note 7. 
 55. See 2019 Copyright Directive, supra note 7, recital (73), arts.16–17; see also 
infra Section III.B. 
 56. Már Másson Maack, The EU’s Disastrous Copyright Reform, Explained by 
Its Lovers and Haters, NEXT WEB (June 19, 2018), 
https://thenextweb.com/eu/2018/06/19/the-eus-disastrous-copyright-reform-
explained/. 
 57. Id. 
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the use of filters would likely be inevitable in order for UUC sites to 
comply with the requirements, as discussed later.58 
Throughout its history of revisions and proposal versions, the 
Directive has seen a plethora of both support and opposition by copyright 
owners, UUC sites, and proponents of freedom of expression.59 Many 
large UUC sites and proponents of fair use and freedom of expression 
objected to the upload filter requirement found in the 2016 Proposal, 
which would have required UUC sites to install filters to prevent users 
from uploading works that contained copyrighted material.60 They 
claimed that such a requirement would result in copyrighted works being 
unnecessarily censored as containing infringing material, even when the 
use of the copyrighted material may otherwise be permitted as a parody 
or criticism, or when the use is merely incidental.61  
In contrast, many copyright holders and content creators agree with 
the increased liability for UUC sites and upload filter requirement set 
forth in Article 13 of the 2016 Proposal.62 Many artists have spoken in 
  
 58. See infra Section III.C. 
 59. See Foo Yun Chee, EU Parliament Committee Votes for Tougher EU 
Copyright Rules to Rein in Tech Giants, REUTERS (June 20, 2018, 7:28 AM), 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-eu-copyright/eu-parliament-committee-votes-for-
tougher-eu-copyright-rules-to-rein-in-tech-giants-idUKKBN1JG1FE; Controversial 
Copyright Law Rejected by EU Parliament, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44712475. 
 60. Foo Yun Chee, supra note 59; Timothy Vollmer, With the European 
Parliament Vote on the Copyright Directive, the Internet Lost – For Now, CREATIVE 
COMMONS (Sept. 12, 2018), https://creativecommons.org/2018/09/12/with-the-european-
parliament-vote-on-the-copyright-directive-the-internet-lost-for-now/. 
 61. See Vollmer, supra note 60; Julia Reda, When Filters Fail: These Cases 
Show We Can’t Trust Algorithms to Clean Up the Internet, JULIA REDA (Sept. 28, 2009), 
https://juliareda.eu/2017/09/when-filters-fail/. 
 62. See BBC, supra note 59; Scott Roxborough, Paul McCartney, James Blunt 
Back New European Copyright Law, HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 4, 2018, 4:36 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/paul-mccartney-james-blunt-back-new-
european-copyright-law-1124974; Lars Brandle, David Guetta and All Three Major 
Labels are Among Industry Giants Pushing for Copyright Reform, INDUSTRY OBSERVER 
(June 29, 2018), https://www.theindustryobserver.com.au/david-guetta-and-all-
three-major-labels-are-among-industry-giants-pushing-for-copyright-reform/; 
Martin Banks, Publishers Back Controversial EU Copyright Proposals, PARLIAMENT 
MAG. (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/publishers-back-
controversial-eu-copyright-proposals.  
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favor of the more stringent requirements for UUC sites, claiming that 
implementing the measures required by the 2016 Proposal would help 
“secure [their] creative community into the next decade.”63 Many 
musicians have argued that UUC sites were making large profits from 
the musicians’ works, while the musicians were not being fairly paid for 
their content.64 
In particular, Paul McCartney, former Beatles member, expressed his 
support for the 2016 Proposal, imploring the European Parliament to 
“address the value gap and help assure a sustainable future for the music 
ecosystem and its creators, fans and digital music services alike.”65 In 
addition to Paul McCartney, many other musicians, songwriters, 
publishers, and other content creators worldwide have felt their works 
have been unfairly exploited by UUC sites and have expressed their 
support for the proposals and the use of upload filters.66 They include 
James Blunt, Placido Domingo,67 David Guetta, Ennio Morricone,68 
Annie Lennox,69 the European Magazine Media Association, the 
European Newspaper Publishers’ Association, New Media Europe, the 
European Publishers’ Council,70 Nightlife Music, and Australia’s 
Independent Record Labels Association, among others.71 However, as 
new versions of the 2016 Proposal were discussed during the Parliament 
and Council’s negotiations,72 many previously in favor of the 2016 
Proposal rescinded their support and called for significant revisions of 
the provisions in question.73 However, though they no longer agreed with 
  
 63. Brandle, supra note 62; see also Roxborough, supra note 62 
 64. See Mark Savage, Stars Fail to Convince Politicians, BBC NEWS (July 5, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44712475. 
 65. Roxborough, supra note 62. 
 66. See Brandle, supra note 62; Banks, supra note 62. But cf. Cory Doctorow, 
Now EVERYBODY Hates the New EU Copyright Directive, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/01/now-everybody-hates-
new-eu-copyright-directive. 
 67. Roxborough, supra note 62 
 68. Brandle, supra note 62. 
 69. Savage, supra note 64. 
 70. Banks, supra note 62. 
 71. Reid, supra note 21. 
 72. Reda, supra note 52. 
 73. See Doctorow, supra note 66; Letter from European Coordination of 
Independent Producers (CEPI), et al., (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/17_Jan_2019_European_Creatives_and_Rightsholders_
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the original 2016 Proposal, the content creators retained their desire to 
resolve the wage gap and fair remuneration issues regarding UUC sites.74 
The 2016 Proposal has been widely criticized by proponents of 
freedom of expression on the Internet.75 One of the major concerns 
presented by opponents of the 2016 Proposal is that the existing filtering 
technology is not advanced enough to accurately detect copyright 
infringement and would subject legitimate speech to censorship.76 The 
controversy and debate surrounding the current attempts to reform 
copyright laws have allowed an opportunity to consider the different 
interests and arguments and explore possibilities of copyright reform that 
may better protect the interests of copyright owners, UUC sites, and 
those opposed to preemptive censorship. 
C. Copyright Protection Justifications 
In considering possible copyright reforms, it is important to 
understand the justifications for copyright protection. The most 
commonly recognized justification comes from an incentive (or 
utilitarian) theory for copyright protection.77 The main thrust of this 
theory is that copyright protection allows a copyright owner to exclude 
others from reproducing their works at minimal cost to the infringer and 
selling for a profit.78 Without copyright protection, an infringer would be 
able to sell a work at a significantly lower price than what the original 
creator would because the original creator would need to recover the 
investment in creating the work while the infringer would only need to 
recover the cost of making the copy.79 A lack of copyright protections 
  
Caution_that_New_Draft_of_Article_13_Requires_Urgent_Changes_in_Key_Areas.pdf 
[hereinafter CEPI Letter]. 
 74. See CEPI Letter, supra note 73 
 75. Julia Alexander, ‘Internet Is Under Threat’: What You Need to Know About 
the EU’s Copyright Directive, POLYGON (Sept. 11, 2018, 10:43 AM), 
https://www.polygon.com/2018/9/11/17843664/copyright-directive-europian-union-
parliament-explained-internet-article-13-youtube-fair-use/comment/488598145 (“If [the 
Proposal] stands out to you, you’re concerned, you’re worried – good, you should be.”). 
 76. See Maack, supra note 56. 
 77. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 
6–7 (4th ed. 2015). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 6. 
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would create market competition that would drive the price of the work 
down to the point where the original creator would be unlikely to recover 
their investment.80 With less possibility to recover investments, artists 
and other content creators would have a reduced incentive to invest 
significant amounts of time and other resources into the production of 
their creative works.81 Over time, this could disincentivize content 
creators from producing new works, or at the very least, would reduce 
the quality of new creative works.82  
A further justification for copyright protection comes from the nexus 
between artistic works and culture and the effect that both have on 
society.83 Copyright protection itself plays a role in shaping modern 
culture by incentivizing creators to produce creative works that both 
reflect and influence the culture.84 The DSMS Communication 
recognizes the importance of copyright protection for the cultural 
industry in the EU.85 Further, creative works such as music and movies 
can be vitally important to world culture and can also help bridge gaps 
between different cultures.86 If the economic incentives provided by 
copyright protections disappeared and, as a result, artists were no longer 
creating new music, movies, books, or other works of art that were 
  
 80. See id. 
 81. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 247 (2011); but 
see Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research 
Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143 (2011) (“Everything we know about creativity and 
creative processes suggests that copyright plays very little role in motivating creative 
work.”). 
 82. MERGES, supra note 81, at 246. 
 83. See generally Peter Bazalgette, We Have to Recognise the Huge Value of Arts 
and Culture to Society, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2014, 7:03 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2014/apr/27/value-of-arts-and-culture-to-society-
peter-bazalgette (explaining that art enhances our lives, entertains and helps define 
personal and national identities). 
 84. See Cohen, supra note 81, at 145–46 (“Copyright, then, is a catalyst for, 
rather than an ingredient in, cultural change: It accelerates society’s progress along a 
single, inevitable, merit-based trajectory.”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 350–51 (1996). 
 85. DSMS Communication, supra note 6, at 6. 
 86. See Souad Mekhennet, Bridging Cultural Gaps with Music, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
25, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/world/asia/26iht-letter26.html; Vikas 
Shah, The Role of Film in Society, THOUGHT ECON. (June 19, 2011), 
https://thoughteconomics.com/the-role-of-film-in-society/. 
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relevant to the twenty-first century, then the ability to bridge the gaps 
between cultures by means of the arts would begin to diminish. 
While there are many justifications for copyright protection, this 
protection must be limited so as not to completely bar people from using 
other content creators’ works as the basis for the creation of new works. 
Nearly all works build on previously created works to an extent.87 In fact, 
some creators have largely built entire careers by transforming existing 
works and publishing their remixed creations on UUC sites.88 Entire 
genres of works are based on the ability to create transformative works, 
including commentary videos, memes, reaction videos, and fan fiction, 
among others.89 Over-protective copyright laws would almost certainly 
hinder the production and creation of many different types of later works, 
effectively limiting the livelihood of many contributing to the modern 
Internet-era culture and possibly stifling the creation of new genres in the 
future.90 Therefore, the economic incentives furthered through copyright 
protection of original works must be balanced against the ability of 
creators to make and share such transformative works on the Internet. In 
light of this balance, current EU copyright law has provided for a limited 
allowance of the use of copyrighted material for the purposes of 
criticism, review, parody, caricature, or pastiche.91 
III. THE SAFE HARBOR REGIME, THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COPYRIGHT 
REFORM, AND THE DANGER OF UPLOAD FILTERS 
At the forefront of the debate surrounding EU copyright reform are 
copyright owners seeking legislation that would address the value gap 
and provide an opportunity for fair remuneration for the communication 
of their works on UUC sites.92 A reform of EU copyright laws is 
necessary to ensure that UUC sites may no longer hide behind safe 
  
 87. COHEN ET AL., supra note 77, at 8; MERGES, supra note 81, at 245. 
 88. Alexander, supra note 75. 
 89. Id.; Julia Reda, What the EU Parliament May Add to Copyright Reform 
Plans, JULIA REDA, https://juliareda.eu/eu-copyright-reform/parliament-additions/ (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2019). 
 90. See Alexander, supra note 75. 
 91. See 2001 Copyright Directive, supra note 36, arts. 5(3)(d), (k). 
 92. IFPI, supra note 5, at 26; see also supra Part II (discussing the value gap). 
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harbor laws while exploiting the works of content creators for their own 
profits. 
A. Notice and Takedown and the Safe Harbor Regime 
The E-Commerce Directive limits the liability of UUC sites for 
infringing content that users of the sites upload on two conditions: “(a) 
the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
information . . . or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information.”93 This provision has created a notice and takedown 
mechanism, which allows an exemption from liability for UUC sites that 
expeditiously remove infringing materials after notice by a copyright 
holder.94 The exemption has created a safe harbor regime because the 
UUC sites will not be liable for infringing material uploaded by users of 
the sites as long as the UUC site has no actual knowledge of the 
infringing material.95 Upon notice by a copyright holder of infringing 
material, however, the UUC site would be required to remove that 
material or otherwise risk losing its safe harbor protection against 
liability.96 The safe harbor exemption has been criticized by musicians, 
songwriters, and recording artists, claiming that the UUC sites, which 
monetize the artists’ works, are taking advantage of the exemption and 
exploiting the use of their works.97  
The notice and takedown regime is not without its flaws, and some 
have lamented its ineffectiveness in actually protecting against 
infringement.98 Typically, after a takedown notice has been issued, the 
infringing material will reappear on the same UUC site within hours of 
  
 93. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 32, arts. 14(1)(a)–(b). A “provider” here 
is one that provides a service “that consists of the storage of information provided by a 
recipient of the service,” which would include UUC sites. Id. art. 14. 
 94. Id. art. 14(1)(b). 
 95. Id. art. 14(1)(a). 
 96. See id. art. 14(1)(b); Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their 
European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481, 488 (2009). 
 97. See IFPI, supra note 5, at 26. 
 98. See Stephen Carlisle, DMCA “Takedown” Notices: Why “Takedown” Should 
Become “Take Down and Stay Down” and Why It’s Good for Everyone, NOVA 
SOUTHEASTERN U. (July 23, 2014), http://copyright.nova.edu/dmca-takedown-notices/. 
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its removal.99 As a result, content creators have to issue thousands of 
takedown notices in an ultimately futile attempt to have infringing 
content removed from the UUC sites.100 Practically speaking, the notice 
and takedown system would really only be effective if the number of 
copyright infringements remained low.101 While the safe harbor 
exemption may not have unduly burdened rightholders when it was first 
implemented, the rise of Web 2.0 has led to the unprecedented millions 
of uploads of copyrighted content, rendering notice and takedown 
impracticable and the safe harbor exemption unreasonable.102 In light of 
the flaws in the notice and takedown system and the exemptions from 
liability under these safe harbor laws, copyright reform is needed to 
address the value gap issue and protect the content creators’ works from 
infringement and revenue loss. 
Scholars have posited several varying solutions that could help 
minimize unfair remuneration while still protecting freedom of 
expression. These solutions include encouraging artists to negotiate 
remuneration with Internet media platforms,103 reforming EU copyright 
laws to require platforms to take out extended collective licenses,104 and 
revising notice and takedown provisions into takedown and stay down 
provisions.105 However, these solutions are not without their own 
critiques,106 and some may even still lead to a general monitoring 
obligation that would require upload filters.107 Additionally, because 
  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. LIEBOWITZ, supra note 13, at 9. 
 102. See id. at 7; Carlisle, supra note 98. 
 103. See Savage, supra note 64. 
 104. Julia Reda, Article 13 Is A Mess: Now Even Big Rightholders Disavow It, 
JULIA REDA (Dec. 3, 2018), https://juliareda.eu/2018/12/article-13-mess/. 
 105. Carlisle, supra note 98. 
 106. See e.g., Jonathan Band & Brandon Butler, Some Cautionary Tales About 
Collective Licensing, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 687, 698 (2013) (critiquing extended 
collective licensing regimes in Nordic countries); Zach Blumenfeld, Note, Selling the 
Artist, Not the Art: Using Personal Brand Concepts to Reform Copyright Law for the 
Social Media Age, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 241, 274 (2019) (noting that artists would not 
be likely to want to join a large collecting society with compulsory licenses). 
 107. See Elliot Harmon, “Notice-and-Stay-Down” Is Really “Filter-Everything,” 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/notice-and-stay-down-really-filter-everything; see 
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there is currently no liability for the UUC sites under the safe harbor 
laws,108 large UUC sites would be in no hurry to simply renegotiate 
remuneration with content creators absent some kind of legislation. As 
part of their recent copyright reform efforts in furtherance of the DSMS, 
the European Commission proposed legislation that included measures 
intended to safeguard fair remuneration and to close the value gap.109 
B. The European Union’s Proposals for Copyright Reform 
In its attempt to reform copyright laws, the European Commission 
initially drafted the proposed directive with provisions that would require 
the use of upload filters, or “content recognition technologies,” for UUC 
sites that would recognize and prevent the availability of certain 
infringing works from appearing on the site.110 After a series of 
negotiations between the EU Parliament, the EU Council, and the 
European Commission, a new version of the proposed directive was 
finalized, which then passed a final vote by the European Parliament in 
April of 2019.111 This new version removed the language that requires 
the use of content recognition technologies that was found in earlier 
versions of the proposal.112 The 2016 Proposal stated that “[i]nformation 
society service providers . . . shall . . . take measures . . . to prevent the 
availability on their services of works or other subject-matter identified 
by rightholders through the cooperation with the service providers.”113 
This version explicitly mentioned “the use of effective content 
recognition technologies” as an example of such a measure.114 This 
specific language referencing content recognition technologies is missing 
from the final version of the Directive.115 
Article 17 of the 2019 Copyright Directive instead imposes on UUC 
sites a requirement of obtaining authorization from rightholders 
  
also Frosio, supra note 39, at 355 (noting that it is currently unknown how to implement 
stay-down procedures “without establishing a general monitoring obligation”). 
 108. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 32, art. 14. 
 109. See Frosio, supra note 39, at 354–55, 357–58. 
 110. See 2016 Proposal, supra note 50, art. 13(1). 
 111. New, supra note 7. 
 112. See generally 2019 Copyright Directive, supra note 7. 
 113. 2016 Proposal, supra note 50, art. 13(1). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See 2019 Copyright Directive, supra note 7, art. 17. 
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“cover[ing] acts carried out by users of the services.”116 The 2019 
Copyright Directive also creates a carveout of the safe harbor exemption 
of the E-Commerce Directive for UUC sites by providing that “[w]hen 
an online content-sharing service provider performs an act of 
communication to the public or an act of making available to the public . 
. . the limitation of liability established in Article 14(1) of Directive 
2000/31/EC shall not apply to the situations covered by this Article.”117 
An “act of communication” within the 2019 Copyright Directive 
includes when UUC sites make available to the public subject-matter 
uploaded by users of the sites.118 This removes the safe harbor exemption 
for UUC sites and renders them liable in the absence of authorization 
from rightholders.119 
The Article mentions licensing agreements as a potential method of 
obtaining the requisite authorization before conducting an act of 
communication.120 For large UUC sites where users upload material, this 
would require the UUC sites to preemptively obtain a license for 
everything that a user may possibly upload.121 Some have suggested that 
it would be impossible for a UUC site to obtain such authorization 
because this would effectively require a license for all copyrighted 
content that exists worldwide.122  
However, the 2019 Copyright Directive does attempt to limit the 
liability of the UUC sites by providing that, if they have not obtained 
authorization, they may not be liable if they can demonstrate that they 
have: 
(a) made best efforts to obtain an authorisation, and 
(b) made, in accordance with high industry standards of professional 
diligence, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works and 
  
 116. Id. arts. 17(1)–(2). Article 17 of the Directive is the revised version of the 
2016 Proposal’s Article 13. See New, supra note 7. 
 117. 2019 Copyright Directive, supra note 7, art. 17(3). 
 118. Id. recital (64). 
 119. See id. arts. 17(1)–(3). 
 120. Id. art. 17(1). 
 121. Reda, supra note 53. 
 122. Id. (“Commercial sites and apps where users can post material must make 
‘best efforts’ to preemptively buy licences for anything that users may possibly upload – 
that is: all copyrighted content in the world. An impossible feat.”). 
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other subject matter for which the rightholders have provided the service 
providers with the relevant and necessary information; and in any event 
(c) acted expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated 
notice from the rightholders, to disable access to, or to remove from their 
websites, the notified works or other subject matter, and made best 
efforts to prevent their future uploads in accordance with point (b).123 
The “best efforts” requirement in these liability limitations is 
incredibly ambiguous, and the Directive is largely silent as to the means 
or method by which these “best efforts” obligations can be fulfilled.124 To 
be sure that they are complying with the obligation to make “best efforts 
to ensure the unavailability of specific works” for which they cannot 
obtain a license,125 UUC sites will have very little choice but to simply 
employ content recognition technology to prevent the availability of any 
potentially unauthorized work from appearing on their platform.126 This 
would effectively result in the UUC sites utilizing upload filters to block 
or remove the potentially infringing content because the UUC sites 
would want to stay on the safe side, ultimately removing all possibility of 
any infringing content in an effort to avoid direct liability.127 This 
overcompensation of using an upload filter to block any potentially 
infringing content would lead to censorship of many legitimate uses of 
speech, such as parody or critique, thus conflicting with the EU’s right to 
freedom of expression.128 
However, even assuming that it would be possible for UUC sites to 
demonstrate that they have made “best efforts” to obtain authorization, 
Article 17 still implicitly imposes a general monitoring obligation, which 
would likely result in the use of upload filters.129 A UUC site, after 
  
 123. 2019 Copyright Directive, supra note 7, art. 17(4). 
 124. See generally Press Release, European Comm’n, Questions and Answers – 
European Parliament’s Vote in Favour of Modernised Rules Fit for Digital Age (Mar. 26, 
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attempting to obtain an authorization from a rightholder and failing to 
accomplish that task, would still be subject to a notice and takedown 
requirement for any works for which rightholders have given sufficiently 
substantiated notice.130 The 2019 Copyright Directive further provides 
that after notice from a rightholder, the UUC site must make “best 
efforts” to prevent future uploads of that work.131 In spite of a 
requirement of only “best efforts,” the obligation to prevent future 
uploads of a work would almost inevitably lead to a general monitoring 
obligation requiring the use of upload filters, as other methods would be 
impractical or even impossible.132 This inevitable monitoring obligation 
is in direct conflict with another provision in Article 17, which states that 
the “application of this Article shall not lead to any general monitoring 
obligation.”133 Should the 2019 Copyright Directive become law as 
written, the EU Commission would do well to introduce criteria on how 
to comply with the “best efforts” obligation to prevent future uploads of 
infringing material (similar to a “stay down” mechanism) without 
imposing such a general monitoring obligation.134 
C. A Closer Look at Upload Filters and YouTube’s Content ID 
Though the 2019 Copyright Directive does not explicitly require the 
use of upload filters, the use of filters would still be inevitable either to 
limit liability due to an impossibility of obtaining licenses for 
copyrighted works or to prevent future uploads of infringing works after 
notice has been given by a rightholder.135 A filtering requirement, 
whether explicit or implicit, presents several issues that must be weighed 
against the benefits that such a requirement would advance. In particular, 
the technologies of current upload filters and their algorithms are not 
  
 130. 2019 Copyright Directive, supra note 7, art. 17(4). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See New, supra note 7; Reda, supra note 53. 
 133. 2019 Copyright Directive, supra note 7, art. 17(8). 
 134. See Frosio, supra note 39, at 355 (noting that the E-Commerce Directive also 
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sophisticated enough to be able to distinguish between an unlawful use 
of copyrighted material and a lawful use.136 
Lawful uses under the 2001 Copyright Directive are created by many 
different exceptions and limitations on the reproduction and 
communications rights.137 Among these exceptions are “quotations for 
purposes such as criticism or review”138 and “use for the purpose of 
caricature, parody or pastiche.”139 These exceptions are also explicitly 
allowed for in the 2019 Copyright Directive, as the Directive states that 
users of UUC sites will be “able to rely on any of the following existing 
exceptions or limitations when uploading and making available content 
generated by users on online content-sharing services: (a) quotation, 
criticism, review; (b) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or 
pastiche.”140 Quoting a work for criticism or review, whether it be in the 
form of a literary text, audio recording, visual work, or video recording, 
necessarily requires that a portion of copyrighted work be communicated 
as a part of the new work, which reviews or criticizes the original 
work.141 Similarly, a parody necessitates borrowing elements from 
another previously existing work, as the viewer must be able to recognize 
the previous work for the parody to have the intended effect.142  
Because transformative works use elements of copyrighted material, 
upload filters would likely flag these types of transformative works143 as 
  
 136. See Alexander, supra note 75; Brown, supra note 51;’Disastrous’ Copyright 
Bill Vote Approved, BBC NEWS (June 20, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
44546620. 
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 140. 2019 Copyright Directive, supra note 7, art. 17(7). 
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being infringing and prevent users from uploading a work that should be 
a lawful use under the provisions in the 2019 Copyright Directive.144 
Current available filtering systems do not have algorithms that would be 
able to ascertain the difference between a lawful transformative work and 
an infringing work.145 This can be shown by examining filtering 
algorithms that UUC sites currently utilize in an effort to prevent the 
availability of infringing works uploaded by users of the sites.146  
Perhaps the most prominent and well-developed of these algorithms is 
Content ID, the automated filtering system developed by Google and 
currently used for YouTube.147 The Content ID system scans user-
uploaded videos against a database comprised of files of works submitted 
by copyright owners who meet specified criteria.148 The system detects a 
match and sends a notice to the copyright holder, who has several 
options for actions to take from there.149 The system will flag even a 
partial match of an uploaded video with copyrighted content.150 While 
the content-recognition technologies have been continuously improved 
over the past eleven years, they remain imperfect in detecting 
infringement because of their inability to identify when the use of a 
copyrighted work would be allowed under an exception,151 such as 
parody, criticism, or review.152 This automatic flagging of permitted uses 
of copyrighted material, in turn, would lead to a number of false 
positives,153 where a non-infringing video has been flagged as 
infringing.154 
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The inevitability of false positives would present a problem in 
implementing legislation that would require, explicitly or implicitly, the 
use of upload filters for UUC sites to avoid liability for their users’ 
uploaded content. Because the upload filters would not be able to 
recognize that the use of a copyrighted work in a transformative work 
constituted a parody or quotation for the purpose of criticism,155 the 
algorithms would likely block that content, and many legitimate uses of 
copyrighted content would be censored.156 Such censorship would run a 
great risk of conflict with the right to freedom of expression.157 
D. Balancing of Interests: Copyright Owner’s Interests vs. 
Freedom of Expression 
One of the driving factors for the copyright reform is to provide for 
the fair remuneration for artists and eliminate the value gap.158 While a 
laudable goal, fair remuneration must be balanced against the 
fundamental right of freedom of expression.159 The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which establishes a number 
of fundamental rights for citizens of EU Member States, recognizes 
freedom of expression as a fundamental right.160 The Charter further 
provides that the “right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.”161 
Respect for freedom of expression cannot be guaranteed by the use of 
upload filters, which preemptively block all potentially infringing 
content.162 Because a lawful transformative work, such as a parody, 
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makes use of copyrighted content, an upload filter would block the 
lawful work from ever appearing on the UUC site.163 Parodies have been 
recognized by the European Court of Justice as “a form of artistic 
expression and a manifestation of freedom of expression.”164 The lawful 
uses of copyrighted content that would be censored by the current 
content recognition technologies (false positives) would therefore 
negatively impact freedom of expression.165  
Additionally, the implementation of preemptive upload filters would 
be inconsistent with the E-Commerce Directive, which states that “the 
removal or disabling of access has to be undertaken in the observance of 
the principle of freedom of expression.”166 Both the 2019 Copyright 
Directive’s requirements that UUC sites make “best efforts to prevent . . . 
future uploads”167 and the UUC sites’ desire to avoid direct liability 
would likely lead to the use of preemptive upload filters.168 The 
inadequacy of the current content recognition technologies would lead to 
the censorship of non-infringing works in conflict with both the right of 
freedom of expression and the E-Commerce directive. The fact that a 
particular group of copyright owners feels unfairly compensated for the 
use of their works on UUC sites should not lead to the implementation of 
upload filters that would stifle freedom of expression, even if 
inadvertently. 
IV. LIMITING INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY WITH AN ALGORITHMIC 
NOTIFICATION AND MONETIZATION SYSTEM 
In the absence of any requirement leading to the use of preemptive 
upload filters, how are content creators to ensure the unavailability of 
infringing uses of their works on UUC sites? If one of the driving forces 
of the copyright reform is to provide fair remuneration for content 
creators, would upload filters, which block all potential infringing 
material, truly achieve that goal? Can the current content recognition 
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technologies be used in a way that both protects the rights of copyright 
owners and allows for the freedom of expression of those using 
copyrighted works in lawful ways? 
For many content creators, the mere removal of their copyrighted 
works from UUC sites is not necessarily the ultimate goal.169 The goal, 
rather, is fair compensation for the communication of their works by 
closing the value gap.170 As evidence that removal is not the copyright 
owner’s goal, under YouTube’s current system, when given the 
opportunity either to remove works that have been flagged by the 
algorithm or to earn advertising revenue by keeping them on the site, 
most content creators will choose to allow the content to remain.171 
Despite the fact that YouTube retains forty-five percent of the 
advertisement revenue on a flagged video,172 the monetization option 
remains popular because it allows a copyright holder to benefit from 
another users’ uploading of the copyright holder’s content.173  
If content creators are willing to allow an infringing uploaded work to 
remain on a UUC site in exchange for advertisement revenue 
monetization,174 then perhaps a filtering system like the system YouTube 
uses with Content ID could be implemented among all UUC sites to 
create an algorithmic notification system with an option for 
monetization. YouTube’s current system uses Content ID to scan new 
uploads to the site against a database of copyrighted content.175 Once a 
full or partial match has been found, the copyright owner is notified of 
the matching content and is given several options.176 The copyright 
owner can choose to have the video blocked from being viewed or share 
  
 169. See Alexander, supra note 75. 
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in the monetization of advertisement revenue generated from the 
infringing video and track the viewership statistics of the video.177  
The system is similar to a notice-and-takedown mechanism except 
that here, the original notification comes from the UUC sites to the 
copyright owner, rather than from the copyright owner to the site.178 
After the copyright holder has decided whether to block or monetize the 
allegedly infringing video, the uploader may then dispute the copyright 
holder’s claim if they believe that the claim is incorrect.179 After the 
uploader disputes the claim, the copyright owner must respond within 
thirty days and either release the claim, uphold the claim, submit a 
takedown request, or simply let the claim expire.180 If the uploader’s 
dispute is rejected by the copyright owner, the uploader can again appeal 
the rejected dispute, after which the copyright owner must again respond 
within thirty days with either a release of the claim or a takedown 
request, or they may again simply let the claim expire.181 
Enacting legislation in the EU implementing a system modeled in this 
way could be very beneficial to copyright holders, new content creators, 
and the UUC sites. First, it would limit the liability of the UUC sites for 
infringing content uploaded by users by rendering the UUC sites liable 
for failing to notify the copyright holder of a potentially infringing 
upload, rather than by requiring that infringing material never be found 
on the UUC site.182 This requirement of notification would not unduly 
burden a UUC site for a number of reasons. While the content 
recognition technologies currently available would be inadequate to 
accurately detect only unlawful uses of copyrighted works,183 the 
currently available technologies are adequately capable of detecting 
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 178. See id. 
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potentially infringing content by finding full or partial matches to 
copyrighted material.184 By only requiring notification of potential 
infringements, the UUC sites would be able to utilize the currently 
available, albeit imperfect, content recognition technologies without 
expending significant resources in the future development of a more 
perfect system. 
Second, copyright owners would receive several benefits from 
legislation implementing such a system. Copyright owners would receive 
notification of potentially infringing material without having to spend 
excessive resources locating infringing uploaded material and issuing 
formal takedown notices.185 Copyright owners would also benefit from 
such a system because upon notice from a UUC site of potentially 
infringing material, copyright owners would be provided an option to 
earn revenue from monetization of the infringing upload rather than only 
having the option to issue a takedown request.186 Having the option to 
monetize infringing works uploaded to UUC sites that derive value from 
those works could help to close the value gap. 
Finally, users of these UUC sites who created works that incorporate 
copyrighted material but are non-infringing under one of the exceptions, 
such as quotation, criticism, review, or parody,187 would not have their 
freedom of expression negatively impacted due to unnecessary 
censorship as a result of upload filters.188 This type of system would 
allow users an opportunity to dispute a copyright owner’s claim if the 
uploader believes that the use of the copyrighted work is allowed under 
one of the exceptions.189 A disputed claim would then allow the 
copyright owner an opportunity to more closely look at that particular 
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instance of potential infringement and determine whether they believe 
the uploader’s dispute is valid under one of the exceptions.190 If the 
copyright owner upholds the claim, the uploader would have yet another 
opportunity to appeal to the copyright owner before the copyright owner 
files a formal takedown notice.191 These several opportunities to dispute a 
claim would help protect a UUC site’s users’ freedom of expression by 
allowing them an opportunity to claim one of the allowable uses of 
copyrighted material rather than the work being preemptively censored 
by an upload filter. 
Allowing for the narrowly defined lawful uses under this type of 
algorithmic notification would be much simpler to implement in the EU 
because the EU currently does not recognize a broad fair use doctrine.192 
The relative lack of flexibility in determining whether a use falls under 
an exception under EU law,193 as compared to the fair use doctrine of the 
United States, for example,194 would make effective implementation of 
this system much more feasible. 
  
 190. See id. (click “File a dispute” and “What happens after you dispute” 
hyperlinks). 
 191. Id. (click “If your dispute is rejected, file an appeal” and “What happens after 
you appeal” hyperlinks). 
 192. Alex Dobie, The EU Copyright Directive Is About to Make the Internet 
Worse for Almost Everyone, ANDROID CENT. (Jan. 20, 2019), 
https://www.androidcentral.com/eu-copyright-directive-about-make-internet-
worse-almost-everyone. Fair use allows for “copying of copyrighted material done for 
a limited and ‘transformative’ purpose,” such as quoting from a book when writing a 
review. Richard Stim, What Is Fair Use?, STAN. COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE, 
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/what-is-fair-use/ (last visited Oct. 6, 
2019). The definition of “transformative” is ambiguous, and “[t]here are no hard-and-fast 
rules, only general guidelines and varied court decisions.” Id. 
 193. See Östlund, supra note 143, at 21 (discussing Article 5 of 2001 Copyright 
Directive). Article 17 of 2019 Copyright Directive does not amend Article 5 in a 
meaningful way for the purpose of our discussion. See supra notes 137–42 and 
accompanying text.  
 194. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
266 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.2  
V. OTHER RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPTIMAL EFFECTIVENESS 
OF AN ALGORITHMIC NOTIFICATION SYSTEM 
A. Education of Users Concerning Their Rights 
The algorithmic notification system alone would not necessarily 
adequately achieve all of the goals; there are several other things that 
must happen in order for implementation to be effective. The first is that 
users of UUC sites must be more educated as to their rights to make the 
algorithmic notification system effective. Many users of YouTube 
currently are unaware of the rights they have under copyright law when 
creating and uploading works to the site.195 A large number of current 
YouTube users will not dispute claims made by copyright owners under 
the Content ID system because they lack knowledge about fair use and 
other legitimate uses of copyrighted material or, alternatively, they fear a 
lawsuit from a copyright holder.196  
YouTube’s help page currently includes some information for users 
on fair use and public domain and implores users to “[m]ake sure you 
understand how fair use and the public domain work before you choose 
to dispute for either of those reasons.”197 In the requirements for a 
proposed algorithmic notification system, there should be a provision 
requiring UUC sites not only to make users aware of their relevant rights 
under the 2001 Copyright Directive prior to allowing the user to upload 
content,198 but also make them aware that the user would not be subject 
to a lawsuit after an initial claim, as the copyright holder would have 
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another opportunity to reject the user’s claim without resorting to legal 
action.199 
B. Creating a Database of Copyrighted Material 
Implementation of an algorithmic notification system would require a 
database of copyrighted materials for the content recognition 
technologies to compare new uploads against. YouTube’s Content ID 
currently has its own database of copyrighted works that content owners 
have submitted.200 In contrast to YouTube’s current database, which does 
not allow all content creators to have access to the technology,  this 
database must allow any content creator who wished to receive benefits 
of the algorithmic notification and monetization to submit digital copies 
of their works to the database.201 This could be done by creating a 
copyright registry for content and requiring content creators to register 
their works to be eligible for monetization under the algorithmic 
system.202 A registration system for all EU member countries could be 
implemented similar to the Madrid International Trademark System to 
allow uniformity of the database among all EU member countries and 
among all UUC sites.203 
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C. Resolving the Disparity in Bargaining Power 
Another necessary change needed for effective implementation of the 
proposed algorithmic notification system would be a resolution of the 
unequal bargaining power between large intermediary UUC sites and 
copyright owners.204 As previously discussed, the value gap exists due to 
the disparity between the value derived from copyrighted content by the 
UUC sites and the revenue paid to those copyright owners.205 Because of 
the safe harbor provisions limiting liability, UUC sites currently have 
little incentive to pay copyright owners for permission to allow streaming 
of copyrighted works by the site’s users.206 Because the UUC site can 
stream material and generate revenue without the permission of the 
copyright owners, those copyright owners generally accept the UUC 
site’s offers to pay them something rather than nothing, even though the 
amount paid is considerably lower than if the copyright owners could 
effectively control the availability of their works.207 The copyright 
owners lack this kind of control because of the ineffectiveness of the 
notice and takedown regime in handling the massive numbers of 
infringements on UUC sites.208 The safe harbor exemption for UUC sites 
reduces their willingness to pay copyright owners for permission because 
the works will be available on the UUC sites regardless.209 Therefore, 
suggesting that copyright owners should simply renegotiate deals with 
the UUC sites to achieve fairer remuneration210 is ineffective because 
UUC sites will have little incentive to do so in the absence of legislation 
requiring renegotiation.211 
Because this proposed algorithmic notification system leaves intact 
the notice and takedown mechanism and the safe harbor regime,212 
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another provision must be introduced to help ensure fairer remuneration 
for copyright owners. The 2019 Copyright Directive includes a provision 
stating that “where authors and performers license or transfer their 
exclusive rights for the exploitation of their works or other subject 
matter, they are entitled to receive appropriate and proportionate 
remuneration.”213 The 2019 Copyright Directive states that in 
determining what “appropriate and proportionate” remuneration would 
be, Member States may consider market practices.214 In this case, market 
practices would likely include an evaluation of what other permission-
based streaming platforms pay to copyright owners and could be 
determined based on either the dollar amount per stream paid or a 
percentage of the UUC sites’ revenues paid to copyright owners.215 A 
similar provision should be included in the reform with criteria to aid in 
determining what a fair value would be, such as matching the average 
revenue percentage paid per-stream from permission-based and 
subscription-based streaming services.216  
VI. CONCLUSION 
As it stands now, the 2019 Copyright Directive for EU copyright 
reform presents many issues regarding the feasibilities of (1) complying 
with the requirements for obtaining authorization for works uploaded to 
the site by users, (2) ensuring the unavailability of specific works, and 
(3) the prevention of future uploads of infringing works.217 The first of 
these three requirements would be impractical for most, if not all, UUC 
sites, and even “best efforts” to comply would likely fall short of the 
requirement.218 The latter two of these requirements would effectively 
result in UUC sites resorting to imperfect upload filters, which would 
result in the unnecessary block and censorship of potentially lawful uses 
of copyrighted works, such as criticisms or parodies, directly conflicting 
with the fundamental right of freedom of expression.219 
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However, because the value gap and unfair remuneration of copyright 
owners remains an issue, a reform of EU copyright laws is essential to 
ensure that UUC sites may not continue to hide behind safe harbor laws 
while exploiting the works of content creators for their own profits.220 An 
algorithmic notification and monetization system is a possible solution to 
implement throughout the EU that would help close the value gap and 
provide artists with an opportunity to monetize on infringing uploads 
rather than expending resources issuing countless takedown notices.221 
This system would require UUC sites to utilize content recognition 
technologies that are currently readily available, such as Content ID, to 
scan new uploads for potentially infringing material found in a database 
made from an international copyright registry for the EU.222 After finding 
a match, the UUC would then be required to notify the copyright holder, 
who would have the option to monetize on the advertisement revenue 
that the uploaded infringing work generates for the UUC site.223 The user 
who uploaded the work would then have an opportunity to dispute that 
copyright owner’s claim if the user believes that the work falls under one 
of the exceptions of the 2001 Copyright Directive, such as criticism or 
parody.224 Both the copyright owner and the alleged infringer would each 
have another opportunity to dispute the claims before the copyright 
owner would resort to a formal take-down notice.225 
An algorithmic notification and monetization system would allow for 
a parody or critique to remain on the UUC sites until both the copyright 
owner and the user had an opportunity to claim copyright protection and 
would not be preemptively blocked from appearing on the site, thus 
providing a safeguard against stifling freedom of expression.226 
Additionally, the system would include a provision requiring UUC sites 
to pay a proportionally appropriate amount reflecting the amount that 
permission-based streaming sites pay to copyright owners.227 This system 
would provide a fair balance between the right of freedom of expression 
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and the need for copyright owners to be paid fairly for their works, 
allowing incentives to produce quality content for the enjoyment of the 
European Union. 
 
